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Research Summary: We study the effect of coordination
between businesses on the adaptation of diversified firms.
Using a simulation-based approach, we show that coordi-
nation between businesses limits adaptation, causing the
relative performance of diversified firms to decline relative
to their focused counterparts over time, with this effect
being strongest for moderate levels of relatedness
between, and complexity within, businesses. Given com-
plexity, firms diversifying into moderately related busi-
nesses may therefore be better off limiting coordination
between businesses to a few key activities—if they diver-
sify at all—sacrificing short run synergies for long run
flexibility. Our study thus offers a novel argument for con-
glomerate diversification, while linking work on the costs
of coordination in diversified firms to the literature on
organizational adaptation.
Managerial Summary: While coordination of activities
between businesses enables a diversified firm to realize
synergies, it may also limit the flexibility of each business
to adapt to changing conditions over time. Thus, the very
cross-business coordination that gives a diversified firm
an advantage relative to its single business competitors in
the short run may cause it to fall behind them in the long
run. Using a mathematical simulation, we show that this
negative effect is strongest for firms coordinating across
moderately related businesses with activities that are
highly interdependent. Multibusiness firms—especially
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moderately related diversifiers in complex businesses—
may thus be better off coordinating only those activities
that yield the greatest synergies, foregoing more marginal
synergies in the short run for the sake of long run
flexibility.
KEYWORD S
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The study of coordination costs—the costs of managing multiple business lines within a single
firm—is a topic of central importance to corporate strategy research. Building off transaction cost
theory (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991), scholars have long argued that bureaucratic costs of coordi-
nating between businesses set the limits to corporate diversification (Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992;
Nayyar, 1992). Firms will diversify to the point where the marginal synergies from further diversifi-
cation equal the marginal increase in bureaucratic costs (Jones & Hill, 1988), and these costs will
increase with the interdependence between businesses, so that firms diversifying into related busi-
nesses may be better off choosing a more limited scope than unrelated diversifiers (Zhou, 2011).
While research in this area has traditionally focused on the short run costs of coordination—
including bureaucratic costs of communication and information flow (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Jones &
Hill, 1988; Zhou, 2011), monitoring costs and incentive distortions (Hill et al., 1992; Riordan &
Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1975, 1985), and comparison costs (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008;
Obloj & Zenger, 2017)—recent scholarship has also recognized that the coordination of activities
between businesses may have consequences for the ability of diversified firms to adapt over time
(Rawley, 2010). This work argues that firms operating in multiple businesses may make choices that
are optimal for the overall firm but suboptimal for individual businesses, so coordination may impose
an additional “cost” in the form of organizational rigidity (de Figueiredo, Rawley, & Rider, 2015;
Natividad & Rawley, 2016; Rawley, 2010).
In this study, we extend this line of research by theoretically examining how coordination
between businesses in diversified firms impacts their adaptation. We argue that coordination of
related activities between businesses may increase rigidity within each business, since the business
will no longer be free to make changes to that activity based on its needs alone; at the same time,
coordination of activities between businesses may also enhance cross-business learning, with knowl-
edge and best practices discovered in one business being shared with another (Miller, Fern, &
Cardinal, 2007; Williams, 2007). The net long-run effect of coordination on the performance of
diversified firms thus depends on the relative magnitude of these rigidity and learning effects. Where
the rigidity effects dominate the learning effects, the very coordination that enables diversified firms
to realize synergies between businesses may also inhibit the adaptation of those businesses over time.
Thus, while diversified firms may enjoy a performance advantage relative to their focused counter-
parts in the short run, this advantage may decline—and potentially turn negative—in the long run.
The diversified firm still realizes synergies between businesses, but the benefit of these synergies is
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(partially or wholly) offset by the weaker performance of each business due to its failure to adapt as
effectively as its more focused counterparts.
We further argue that the relative magnitude of these rigidity and learning effects, and therefore
the net long run effect of coordination between businesses on diversified firm performance, will
depend on the relationships between the firm's activities. More specifically, we build on prior work
that has highlighted the effect of interdependence within a business—that is, complexity—on organi-
zational adaptation (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003) by
examining how complexity within businesses interacts with interdependence between businesses—
that is, relatedness—to impact adaptation in diversified firms. First, we expect that coordination
between businesses will increase with their relatedness, given the greater potential for synergies, thus
increasing both rigidity and cross-business learning in the long run. Second, we argue that complex-
ity will amplify the rigidity effects of coordination, with coordination between businesses con-
straining not only those activities that are coordinated between businesses, but also those activities
that depend on these coordinated activities (Claussen, Kretschmer, & Stieglitz, 2015). At the same
time, increasing complexity may boost the benefits of cross-business learning, as the greater diffi-
culty of adaptation within businesses makes cross-business learning more valuable (Claussen et al.,
2015; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003).
We study the joint effect of relatedness and complexity on the performance of diversified firms
over time using a simulation-based approach. Specifically, we develop a modified version of the NK
model (Levinthal, 1997) in which a diversified firm searches over two landscapes while coordinating
choices between them, and compare the performance of this diversified firm to the (combined) per-
formance of two focused firms, each searching on a single landscape. The results from our simulation
show that coordination between businesses has a negative long-run effect on a diversified firm's per-
formance relative to that of its single business counterparts—that is, diversified firms face long run
coordination costs—with this negative effect having a nonlinear relation with both relatedness and
complexity. The negative long run consequences of coordination increase with relatedness, but at a
decreasing rate, eventually starting to decline as cross-business learning between highly related busi-
nesses becomes increasingly valuable. In the presence of complexity, therefore, coordination between
businesses is most harmful for adaptation at moderate levels of relatedness. We also find a nonlinear
relationship between these long run negative effects and complexity: modest levels of complexity
impose severe constraints on a diversified firm's ability to adapt, but increases in complexity beyond
moderate levels have little additional effect.
Having examined the effects of relatedness and complexity on the adaptation of diversified firms,
we then extend our analysis to consider the short run synergies (net of bureaucratic costs) from coor-
dination between businesses. Two key findings emerge from this analysis. First, we find that the opti-
mal number of activities between businesses that a diversified firm should coordinate is generally
less than the number of related activities (i.e., activities with positive potential synergies) between
them, with this gap being greater for more complex businesses. Rather than exploiting every poten-
tial synergy, diversified firms may be better off realizing only a handful of the most important syner-
gies between businesses, leaving the rest untapped. In the extreme, firms in complex businesses may
be better off not diversifying at all. This is because the loss of potential synergies in the short run is
more than compensated for by the long run benefits of superior adaptation. Second, we find that,
given complexity, the long run advantage of diversified firms has a curvilinear relationship with
relatedness: the performance advantage of moving from low to moderate relatedness is substantially
less than that of moving from moderate to high relatedness.
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These findings contribute to corporate strategy research in a number of ways. First, we develop
and extend the idea that coordination between businesses in diversified firms may be a source of
rigidity, moving beyond recent empirical work that has documented rigidity in diversified firms
(Natividad & Rawley, 2016; Rawley, 2010) to examine how the long run costs of coordination
between businesses in diversified firms increase with both relatedness and complexity (Burgelman,
Snihur, & Thomas, 2019). By highlighting the role of complexity in driving rigidity, we not only
show that interdependence within businesses may cause the performance of diversified firms to vary
in nonlinear ways, we also help connect this work to the broader literature on organizational adapta-
tion in the face of complexity (Aggarwal & Wu, 2015; Claussen et al., 2015; Ethiraj & Levinthal,
2004; Levinthal, 1997). Second, we shift the focus from the question of how widely a firm should
diversify its portfolio of businesses (Jones & Hill, 1988; Zhou, 2011) to the question of how deeply
it should coordinate within that portfolio. While prior work has focused on the problem of excessive
diversification (Markides, 1992, 1995), arguing and showing that diversified firms may
underperform if they enter too many businesses (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000), our findings point
to a problem of excessive coordination, suggesting that diversified firms may underperform if the
quest for synergies causes them to coordinate too much between any two businesses. Diversified
firms thus face a potential trade-off between maximizing synergies in the short run or maintaining
flexibility in the long run. Third, our findings highlight a potential advantage of conglomerate diver-
sification, showing that, in the presence of complexity, diversification into largely unrelated busi-
nesses may be no worse—and potentially better—in the long run than diversification into moderately
related businesses. They also suggest that firms in highly complex businesses may be better off not
diversifying at all. These findings thus extend recent work examining the implications of within busi-
ness complexity for organizational scope and structure choices (Brahm & Tarzijan, 2016; Weigelt &
Miller, 2013). Finally, we rigorously model the long run effects of coordination between businesses,
considering not only the short run economies of scope and bureaucratic costs from coordinating
between businesses, but also the long run rigidity and learning effects of such coordination, thus pro-
viding a stronger theoretical foundation for further exploration of questions around the strategy,
structure, and performance of diversified firms.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 | Relatedness, coordination, and adaptation in diversified firms
Scholars of strategy and organization have long been interested in the costs of hierarchical gover-
nance and the limits they impose on firm scope (Coase, 1937; Penrose, 1959; Williamson, 1975,
1985, 1991). In particular, prior work has emphasized the role that costs of coordination play in set-
ting the limits to corporate diversification (Jones & Hill, 1988; Zhou, 2011). While diversified firms
may realize economies of scope from sharing resources and capabilities between related businesses
(Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; Levinthal & Wu, 2010; Markides & Williamson, 1994; Miller,
2006; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Rumelt, 1974, 1982; Yao, 1988), the realization of these
scope economies will require coordination within the firm's hierarchy (Teece, 1980, 1982), and such
coordination will give rise to bureacratic costs (Jones & Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Thus,
firms should only diversify to the point where the additional synergies from entering a marginal busi-
ness equal the increase in bureaucratic costs from doing so (Jones & Hill, 1988); diversification
beyond this optimal level will result in declining performance (Markides, 1992, 1995; Palich et al.,
2000). Moreover, these bureaucratic costs may vary with both the nature of diversification (Nayyar,
1794 CHEN ET AL.
1992) and the structure of the organization (Hill et al., 1992); specifically, they may increase with the
extent of relatedness between businesses, with the result that firms diversifying into more related
areas may choose a more limited scope (Zhou, 2011). These costs may include the costs of communi-
cation and information transfer (Jones & Hill, 1988; Zhou, 2011), costs of incentive degradation
(Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1991, 1993; Riordan & Williamson, 1985;
Williamson, 1985), influence activities (Alonso, Dessein, & Matouschek, 2008; Milgrom & Roberts,
1988), and agency (Amihud & Lev, 1981, 1999; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997, 1999; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976), costs of inter-unit conflict (Argyres, 1995; Porter, 1985), and comparison costs of
envy between units (Larkin, Pierce, & Gino, 2012; Nickerson & Zenger, 2008; Obloj & Zenger,
2017; Rawley & Simcoe, 2010). As shown in Figure 1, coordination between businesses in a diversi-
fied firm thus produces both (intra-temporal1) economies of scope and bureaucratic costs in the short
run,2 with firms only choosing to diversify and coordinate across businesses if the former dominates
the latter.
In addition to these costs and benefits, which impact diversified firm performance in the short
run, coordination between businesses may also have longer run effects. In particular, recent scholar-
ship has highlighted the potential for diversification to increase organizational rigidity (Aggarwal &
Wu, 2015; de Figueiredo et al., 2015; Rawley, 2010). Decisions in individual businesses within
diversified firms may be “sublimated to serve the greater good of the overall firm” (Rawley, 2010,
p. 873), and this may create barriers to successful adaptation, as the choices firms make to realize
economies of scope between businesses constrain their ability to adapt successfully within businesses
(Natividad & Rawley, 2016).3 Coordination between businesses, while enabling firms to realize syn-
ergies in the short run, may thus compromise the performance of individual businesses, and therefore
of the firm as a whole, in the long run.
Coordination across businesses may also produce additional long run benefits for diversified
firms. A key advantage of coordination is the potential for businesses to learn from each other over
time. Firms that successfully adapt will seek to replicate the outcomes of successful adaptation inter-
nally (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Rivkin, 2001; Zollo & Winter, 2002) and this may apply not only to
replication across similar units within a single business firm, but also to transfer and replication
between units of related businesses within a diversified firm (Kim & Anand, 2018; Miller et al.,
2007; Williams, 2007). First, in so far as a resource or capability is shared between businesses in
such a firm, any enhancement of that resource or capability through innovation will benefit the




Short Run Long RunFIGURE 1 Effects of coordination
between businesses in diversified firms
1Since we are focused on the benefits and costs of coordinating between businesses, we do not consider inter-temporal
economies of scope that arise from redeployment across businesses (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Levinthal & Wu, 2010;
Sakhartov & Folta, 2015; 2016) in our analysis.
2This does not mean that economies of scope and bureaucratic costs matter only in the short run; only that they are realized
relatively soon after coordination starts, and continue as long as coordination continues. In practice, moreover, some
economies of scope and bureaucratic costs may take a few periods to be realized, while some of the long run effects of
coordination we discuss next may become apparent fairly quickly; the distinction between short and long run in Figure 1 is
therefore best thought of as a continuum.
3This is not to suggest that diversified firms cannot change their choices in individual businesses, only that when choosing to
do so they will need to consider not only the impact on the focal business but also the impact on the related business. To the
extent that making a change in one business means sacrificing the (net) synergies between businesses, diversification thus
raises the threshold for changes within a business, slowing adaptation.
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performance of both businesses. Both businesses may thus enjoy economies of learning (Yao, 1988)
as a consequence of coordination between them. Second, a routine or best practice developed in one
business may be shared with a related business within the firm. Coordination between businesses
may thus allow each business to make discoveries—either jointly for coordinated activities or
through knowledge transfer between businesses whose activities are coordinated—it may not have
made on its own (Markides & Williamson, 1994).4 In this way, coordination between businesses,
while harmful for autonomous adaptation, may be beneficial for cooperative adaptation (Alonso,
Dessein, & Matouschek, 2015; Claussen et al., 2015; Williamson, 1991). Figure 1 shows these two
long run effects of coordination in diversified firms: a rigidity effect (which acts as a cost, reducing
performance), and a cross-business learning effect (which benefits performance).
Whether coordination benefits or hurts the performance of a diversified firm in the long run
depends on which of these effects dominates. Even if the rigidity effect dominates the learning
effect—meaning that the net long run effect of coordination is negative—that does not necessarily
mean that the diversified firm underperforms focused firms in the long run; only that its relative
advantage declines. Since the diversified firm will continue to enjoy the benefits of economies of
scope between businesses (net of bureaucratic costs) as a result of coordination, it may still be better
off coordinating between businesses in the long run, just not as well off as it was in the short run.
Moreover, even if the effect of rigidity were to make a firm underperform its focused counterparts in
the long run, the firm may not always correct course, given the adjustment costs of changing coordi-
nation (Argyres, Bigelow, & Nickerson, 2015; Argyres, Mahoney, & Nickerson, 2019). First, in
many cases, the choices firms make regarding coordination may be hard to reverse, given invest-
ments in specialized capabilities and ongoing commitments linked to those choices (Ghemawat,
1991). Second, even if the investments linked to the firm's choices are sunk, path dependence may
make adjustments to firm capabilities costly in the short run (Lee, 2008; Leonard-Barton, 1992;
Levinthal & March, 1993). A firm that chose to separate activities that were previously coordinated
would experience an immediate drop in synergies, but the benefits of better adaptation within each
business would take time to accrue, resulting in short-term losses for the firm (Natividad & Rawley,
2016). Moreover, separating businesses that were previously linked together may prove disruptive,
even if the coordination between them was yielding few synergies (Feldman, 2014; Karim & Kaul,
2015), further lowering short run performance. Third, it may be cognitively challenging to discern
that the shortfall in firm performance is a consequence of coordination, especially in the presence of
high levels of interdependence within and between businesses (Kaplan & Henderson, 2005). At any
point in time, the firm will be able to clearly observe the contemporaneous benefits of coordination
in the form of realized synergies, but may find it hard to discern the gradual decline in its perfor-
mance in each business as a consequence of coordination.
2.2 | Role of complexity
These long run effects of coordination—rigidity and learning—will not only depend on the extent of
relatedness (and hence the extent of coordination) between businesses, they may also be moderated
by the extent of interdependence between different activities within each business, that is, its com-
plexity (Burgelman et al., 2019; Milgrom & Roberts, 1995; Porter, 1985; Siggelkow, 2002;
4Note that neither of these mechanisms of cross-business learning involves taking a resource or capability out of one business
and placing it in another; that is, they are benefits of coordination rather than redeployment between businesses. Even though
they accrue over the long run, these cross-business learning benefits are thus distinct from inter-temporal economies of scope
(Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004).
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Thompson, 1967; Weigelt & Miller, 2013). The prior literature has long emphasized the role of com-
plexity in increasing organizational rigidity by causing firms to get stuck at local optima (Gavetti &
Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2007; Siggelkow & Levinthal,
2003, 2005), and shown that such interdependence within businesses has implications for firm per-
formance (Lee & Alnahedh, 2016; Lenox, Rockart, & Lewin, 2010). It seems only natural to extend
the insights from this work to a diversified firm setting.
In order to do so, we conceptualize each business of the firm as a value chain of activities
(Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Porter, 1985; Qian, Agarwal, & Hoetker, 2012)—manufacturing, mar-
keting, R&D, procurement, etc.—each supported by a (operational) capability that allows it to per-
form that activity (Helfat et al., 2007; Helfat & Winter, 2011). Note that, for our purposes, we think
of capabilities quite broadly—to include physical assets and resources, knowledge, and routines, as
well as bundles of these together—whatever enables the firm to complete an activity in a reliable and
minimally satisfactory manner (Helfat & Winter, 2011; Winter, 1995). Firms make choices on indi-
vidual activities by investing in changing or maintaining their capabilities, in an attempt to maximize
the performance of the overall firm. Interdependence within businesses refers to relationships
between different activities within the same business, meaning that the performance consequences of
the firm's choices on one activity are a function of its choice on others. This in turn means that the
capabilities associated with these choices may need to be co-specialized (Argyres & Zenger, 2012;
Kaul, 2013; Williamson, 1975). We define the complexity of each business as the number of such
interdependencies within it (Weigelt & Miller, 2013). Similarly, we define the relatedness of any
two businesses as the extent of interdependence between them. Interdependence between businesses
refers to the potential relationships between corresponding activities in different businesses, meaning
that the performance consequences of the firm's choice on the focal activity in one business are simi-
lar to that in the other. This in turn means that the firm may benefit from coordinating that activity
between businesses, in order to realize economies of scope (Hart & Holmstrom, 2010; Levinthal &
Wu, 2010; Miller, 2006; Teece, 1980, 1982). Figure 2 provides a simple illustration of this conceptu-
alization for a firm operating in two businesses (A & B), with three value chain activities (1, 2, and
3) in each business.
The simple representation in Figure 2 points to the ways in which complexity may impact adapta-









FIGURE 2 Interdependence within and between businesses
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Wu, 2015; Natividad & Rawley, 2016; Rawley, 2010). If choices on activities within a business are
linked to each other (Porter, 1985; Siggelkow, 2002), then a constraint on any one of those choices
potentially serves as a constraint on them all (Kapoor & Furr, 2015; Wu, Wan, & Levinthal, 2014). It
follows that in a complex setting, coordination between businesses on an activity does not simply
constrain the choice on that activity, it impacts the choices on all other activities that are linked to the
coordinated activity. For instance, choosing to coordinate activities A1 and B1 between the two busi-
nesses in Figure 2 would not only constrain the firm's choices on those two activities, it would also
impact choices on activities A2, B2, and B3.
As an example of such amplification of rigidity, consider the case of Motorola's entry into
semiconductors, as described in Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell, and Klepper (2000). While
Motorola did not coordinate its technology choices between its new semiconductor business and
its legacy business, it did seek to leverage its legacy relationship with the military when entering
semiconductors. In particular, Motorola chose to focus on hybrid technologies rather than thin
film and monolithic devices because “hybrid technology's reliability, relatively low price, and
suitability for its main customer recommended it to Motorola” (Holbrook et al., 2000, p. 1024,
italics added). And even when Motorola did eventually pursue more advanced technologies, its
attempts to do so were “hampered by its geographic isolation from the new Northern California
semiconductor center” and the fact that its “corporate research connections were with companies
no longer on the technology frontier” (Holbrook et al., 2000, p. 1024); in other words, by
choices—its Phoenix location, its partnership with RCA and Bell Labs—it had made at the behest
of the military. Thus, Motorola's technology choices in semiconductors were constrained by its
coordination of customer relationships with its other business, even though the technology choices
themselves were specific to semiconductors.
On the other hand, complexity may also enhance the benefits of learning across businesses, as
increasing complexity makes replication more valuable (Rivkin, 2001). More specifically, coordina-
tion between businesses, and the resulting imitation of one business's choices in the other, may bene-
fit the firm in two ways (Csaszar & Siggelkow, 2010). First, to the extent that the two businesses are
similar, the firm may benefit from mimicking combinations of choices between businesses
(Csaszar & Siggelkow, 2010). As complexity increases, finding the optimal combination of choices
across activities within a business becomes more challenging (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal,
1997), so if a diversified firm is able to transfer the knowledge of how best to combine resources
(Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Qian et al., 2012) from one business to another, this may give it an
advantage relative to its focused counterparts. Second, diversified firms may benefit from the dis-
lodging effect of coordination on adaptation within each business (Csaszar & Siggelkow, 2010). As
prior work has shown, mechanisms that draw search away from local optima—such as unnecessary
linkages between modules (Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003), environmental shocks (Claussen et al.,
2015), and imperfect imitation (Posen, Lee, & Yi, 2013)—may prove beneficial in contexts with high
complexity. Coordination of activities between businesses may thus serve to dislodge or “scramble”
search activities within businesses, resulting in stronger performance.
3 | A SIMULATION-BASED APPROACH
The preceding discussion suggests that coordination between businesses may either enable or hin-
der the adaptation of businesses in a diversified firm, and that complexity within businesses may
either amplify or ameliorate this effect. The net implications of coordination between businesses in
the presence of both relatedness and complexity for the long run performance of diversified firms
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are thus hard to determine using verbal theory alone. We therefore choose to adopt a simulation-
based approach to investigate these effects further. Doing so allows us to consider a wide range of
values for key underlying drivers, while controlling for other factors that may impact the perfor-
mance of diversified firms. We are thus able to clearly isolate the effect of coordination between
businesses on long run firm performance, as well as the moderating effect of complexity on this
main effect. We are also able to consider a full range of potential values of complexity within and
relatedness between businesses in a way that would be hard to do empirically.5 Moreover, a
simulation-based approach allows us to formally explore the combined effect of multiple factors
that may drive diversified firm adaptation in a systematic way, thus enabling more rigorous devel-
opment of theory. Finally, using a simulation allows us to build on and connect with prior theoreti-
cal work that has explored adaptation in single business firms (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004;
Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997).
3.1 | Multiple landscapes and business relatedness
In order to model adaptation in diversified firms, we start with the basic NK landscape set-up
used in prior work (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2007), that is, we model a firm
searching on a landscape of N = 12 binary choices with the outcome of each choice depending
upon the value of K other choices, where 0 ≤ K < N is thus a parameter reflecting the complexity
of the business (details of the NK model framework we use can be found in online Appendix A).
We adopt this set-up because it is the canonical simulation model for studying firm adaptation in
the face of complexity and has been widely used for this purpose in the prior literature (Claussen
et al., 2015; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Levinthal, 1997; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003; Sor-
enson, 2003).
Since we are interested in studying adaptation in diversified firms, however, we modify this
set-up by including not one but two landscapes. Specifically, we consider two related NK land-
scapes of the same structure, without loss of generality. To model relatedness, we utilize a param-
eter R which captures the number of elements that have similar contribution functions in both
landscapes (Csaszar & Siggelkow, 2010), with R taking values between 0 and N. This reflects the
idea that relatedness will mean similarity of activities between businesses, so that choices that
work well in one business will also work well in the other. Rather than assume that all R activities
are exactly the same across landscapes, we model a sliding scale of similarity, with the first ele-
ment being the most similar across landscapes, the second less similar, and so on.6 More specifi-
cally, for any value of R, we assume the contribution function for the ith element of the second
landscape is given by αc + (1 − α)c0 where c is the contribution of the ith element of the first
landscape, c0 is the contribution of the ith element of a randomly generated alternate landscape
with same value of N and K as the first landscape, and α=1− i−1R for 0< i≤R; 0 forR< i≤N.
When R is zero, the two businesses are independent, and there is no relationship between the perfor-
mance of any elements across the two landscapes. As relatedness increases, the landscapes start to
5It may be the case, for instance, that relatedness and complexity are negatively correlated in practice, with businesses that are
more complex being less likely to be closely related to other businesses. If such a correlation existed, it would make it difficult
to empirically separate the effects of relatedness and complexity, even though they are conceptually orthogonal. One
advantage of the simulation is that it allows us to consider the full range of possible values of our parameters of interest,
without having to assume, or being limited by, a relation between them.
6For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that the elements are arranged in the order of decreasing relatedness.
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look more similar. For parsimony, we assume that both landscapes have the same K, that is, they are
both equally complex.7
3.2 | Local search
Consistent with prior work (Levinthal, 1997), we model firms as boundedly rational actors (Simon,
1947), undertaking local search on these landscapes, that is, evaluating alternatives adjacent to their
current position, and choosing the first alternative that has better performance. Specifically, it means
that firms search by randomly changing exactly one element of their current configuration. If the per-
formance of the new configuration is superior to that of their existing configuration then the new con-
figuration is adopted; if not, then the current configuration is retained, and the firm tries a different
alternative in the next period. Search ends where all local alternatives have been evaluated, and none
of them has a higher performance.
For diversified firms, this procedure is modified in that instead of searching on one landscape the
firm searches on both landscapes simultaneously. The search process continues to be local, in that
the firm evaluates changes in one element at a time.8 However, we assume that the decisions between
the two landscapes are coordinated; specifically, we define a parameter L of the extent of this coordi-
nation, such that the choices on the first L elements have to be consistent, that is, if the firm changes
one of the L elements on one landscape, it has to simultaneously change the same element on the
other landscape as well. This assumption reflects the need for coordination in order for the potential
synergies between businesses to be realized (Hart & Holmstrom, 2010; Zhou, 2011). We begin by
considering the case where the firm coordinates all related activities, that is, L = R, though we relax
this assumption later in our analysis.9
3.3 | Synergies
To model synergies, we introduce a parameter δ ≥ 0, which captures the net short run synergies
from coordinating activities between businesses for the diversified firm, that is, it captures the
economies of scope from the sharing of capabilities (Levinthal & Wu, 2010; Montgomery &
Wernerfelt, 1988; Rumelt, 1974; Yao, 1988) less bureacratic costs (Jones & Hill, 1988;
Williamson, 1985).10 Specifically, we assume that the firm realizes synergies equal to δαc for
every element i it coordinates (i.e., every i ≤ L), and only for those elements, consistent with our
7We also assume that the structure of interdependence is the same across both businesses, though as we discuss later, our
results are robust to relaxing this assumption. Note also that this assumption does not mean that the actual interdependence is
the same across businesses. Because of the way we model contribution functions, the payoffs from the same choices in
different businesses are different. We are only assuming that the same sets of activities that are interdependent in one business
are also interdependent in the other; the extent of their interdependence still varies.
8To avoid giving the focused firms a substantial processing power advantage—letting them make two decisions for every one
the diversified firm makes—we allow the diversified firm to make two choices for every one made by each focused firm. Note
that this does not impact the steady state that the firms achieve, which is what we are principally concerned with in our
analyses.
9In general, we assume that L ≤ R, that is, a firm will not coordinate activities unless they are (at least somewhat) similar. This
follows logically from the assumption that coordinating unrelated activities produces no synergistic benefits
(α = 0 for R < i ≤ N); in the absence of such benefits, it makes no sense for the firm to constrain itself by coordinating
unrelated activities between businesses.
10We assume that δ ≥ 0, that is, coordination costs are not greater than economies of scope. If this were not the case, the firm
would have no incentive to diversify in the first place. Put differently, we assume that a firm will only coordinate activities
between businesses if the economies of scope from doing so are equal to or greater than the resulting coordination costs. This
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assumption that coordination is necessary to realize synergies. This implies that the extent of syn-
ergies realized is proportional to the similarity between the activities in the two landscapes; the
logic being that the extent to which the firm can share capabilities related to that activity between
the two businesses (and therefore the extent to which it can realize economies of scope) is limited
by the extent of similarity between the activities.11 For the purposes of our analysis, we examine




2N as reflecting reasonable levels of net synergies.
12 With high enough syner-
gies diversification is always the dominant choice; we therefore confine our analysis to a range of
parameter values where the net short run synergies and long run effects of coordination are poten-
tially comparable in magnitude.
3.4 | Diversified firm advantage
We compute the performance advantage of a diversified firm by comparing its performance to
that of two single business firms.13 Specifically, we calculate diversification advantage as the
difference between a diversified firm's performance and the combined performance of two equiv-
alent single business firms independently searching on each landscape, as a proportion of the
focused firms' performance. Our approach is thus analytically similar to the “chop-shop”
approach used in the diversification discount literature (Lang & Stulz, 1994; Villalonga, 2004).
To study how diversification advantage changes with relatedness and complexity, we run our
simulation at levels of K ranging from 0 to 11 and R ranging from 1 to 12.14 The reported
results for each combination of K and R are the average of 100 randomly generated simulation
runs where in each run the performance of 100 firms are aggregated (Levinthal, 1997). In com-
mon with most of the NK literature, we do not consider competition between firms in our simu-
lation (though see Lenox, Rockart, & Lewin, 2006, 2007 for noteworthy exceptions). Our
measure of diversification advantage is thus best thought of as a measure of the advantage of
diversified firms in terms of their internal efficiency or productivity, rather than their profitabil-
ity per se.
4 | ANALYSES AND FINDINGS
4.1 | Complexity, relatedness, and the long run effects of coordination
We begin by modeling the long run effects of coordination by themselves: that is, we ignore short
run synergies (setting δ = 0) and consider the pure effect of coordinating the choices of the L ele-
ments of the two landscapes on the diversified firm's relative performance. In the absence of synergy,
is also a reason for assuming that L ≤ R; for values of L > R coordination costs would presumably exceed economies of scope,
making coordination beyond that point sub-optimal.
11Making synergies a function of α also means that synergies increase with coordination at a decreasing rate. As online
Appendix B shows, our main findings are robust to making synergies independent of α, or making α independent of R.
12Intuitively, a value of δ= 1N means that the capability is 8.33% more productive on average in each business as a result of
being shared, even after accounting for the coordination costs associated with sharing.
13For ease of presentation, the results presented below normalize performance by setting the value of the global peak on each
landscape to 1. Our findings are unchanged if we use non-normalized scores.
14In the interests of parsimony, the results below show only the simulations corresponding to K=2, 6, and 10, that is, low
complexity, moderate complexity, and high complexity respectively. Results for other values of K (available from the authors)
are consistent with the pattern shown by these values. We also do not plot values of R = 0 since, by definition, there is no
difference between a diversified firm and its focused counterparts in that case.
CHEN ET AL. 1801
coordination between businesses has no immediate benefits, so it is unclear that a firm would ever
choose to diversify.15 But that is precisely where we want to begin—by isolating the effect of related-
ness and complexity on the adaptation of diversified firms—before expanding our analysis to include
the effect of synergies.
Figure 3 shows the effect of coordinating activities between businesses in the diversified firm.
Specifically, it shows how the average performance of a diversified firm evolves over time (starting
from a random point on the landscape) compared to the combined average performance of two
focused firms over the same period. For illustrative purposes, we choose moderate values of related-
ness (R = 6) and complexity (K = 6) for this figure, though we could draw similar graphs for any fea-
sible value of R and K. Figure 3 shows that while the diversified firm starts off at the same
performance level as its focused counterparts, its performance soon falls below that of the focused
firms. Eventually, the performance of the focused firms as well as that of the diversified firm asymp-
totes, with the diversified firm's steady state performance being substantially below that of the
focused firms, even though it started at the same level. This persistent gap in the performance of the
diversified firm relative to its focused counterparts is the result of its inability to fully adapt within
businesses as it coordinates between businesses.
Figure 4a plots long run diversification advantage (i.e., the value of diversification advantage
once both diversified and focused firms have arrived at a steady state) as a function of the level of
relatedness (R) for low, moderate, and high levels of complexity (K = 2, 6, 10, respectively), as well
as for the baseline case where there is no interdependence within the businesses (K = 0). Figure 4a
shows that, absent short run synergies, the long run performance of diversified firms is always lower
than that of their focused counterparts; in other words, the rigidity effects of coordinating between
businesses dominate the cross-business learning effects.
Figure 4a also shows that, given complexity, this negative long run effect of coordination has a
curvilinear relationship with relatedness. The disadvantage of diversified firms increases with related-
ness but at a decreasing rate, with the relationship eventually reversing for high relatedness with
FIGURE 3 Diversified vs. focused
firm performance over time (without
synergy)
15In fact, by setting δ = 0 we are assuming that net synergies are zero. Given that coordination between businesses will give
rise to bureaucratic costs (Jones & Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1985) even if they do not result in economies of scope, one might
further consider the case where net synergies were negative, that is, δ < 0. We do not consider that case here, since we are
only interested in the consequences of coordination for adaptation.
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moderate to high complexity (K = 6, 10).16 Thus, moderately related diversifiers suffer long run neg-
ative consequences of coordinating between businesses that are almost as severe as those for highly
related diversifiers, and potentially more severe if complexity is moderate to high. Note that this
nonlinear relationship between long run effects and relatedness only arises on account of complexity
within businesses; where such complexity is absent (the K = 0 case), diversification advantage more




FIGURE 4 (a) Long run effects of
coordination between businesses.
(b) Cross-business learning benefits.
(c) Rigidity effect
16Online Appendix C plots the K = 6 and K = 10 lines along with their confidence intervals to confirm that the relationship is,
in fact, U-shaped.
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the effects of complexity essentially disappear at the highest levels of relatedness, with the K = 2,
K = 6, and K = 10 lines rising up to meet the K = 0 line at R = 12.
To see what drives this overall diversification disadvantage, we break it down into its two constit-
uent parts (as discussed earlier and shown in Figure 1): rigidity effects and cross-business learning
effects. In order to separate the two, we start by allowing the diversified firm to achieve a steady
state, then relax the constraints placed on it (by setting L = 0) and allow it to search further, eventu-
ally comparing the steady state performance of this first constrained then unconstrained firm to that
of its never constrained (focused) counterparts. The intuition is that even if we stop coordinating
between businesses, the benefits of past learning persist—each business continues to use the best
practices and routines it has discovered as a consequence of coordinating with the other—even if
there is no further learning.17 At the same time, stopping coordination unconstrains each business,
allowing it to make autonomous choices, and thus overcome past rigidity. The relative advantage of
the newly unconstrained firm thus provides a measure of the cross-business learning effects of coor-
dination in the long run. Figure 4b graphs these cross-business learning effects as a function of relat-
edness for the same four values of K (0, 2, 6, and 10) used in Figure 4a.
Figure 4b shows that the benefits of cross-business learning generally increase with relatedness.
This is fairly intuitive: the greater the similarity between two businesses, the greater the advantage
from sharing knowledge between them. It also shows that in the absence of complexity (K = 0), there
are no long run cross-business learning benefits of coordination between businesses. The intuition
here is that so long as each activity is independent of the other, both focused and diversified firms
will eventually arrive at the optimal choice for that activity, so the diversified firm has no long run
advantage relative to focused firms.18 The cross-business learning effects shown in Figure 4b arise
because in the presence of complexity single business firms tend to get stuck at lower value local
optima, which diversified firms avoid because coordination between businesses allows them to dis-
cover combinations of choices they would not otherwise have made.19
Figure 4c then plots the rigidity effects of coordination, which are calculated by subtracting the
cross-border learning effect in Figure 4b from the net long run effect in Figure 4a. It shows that rigid-
ity effects initially increase with relatedness, but the rate of increase decreases as the two businesses
grow more related, with the relationship reversing for high values of complexity and relatedness. As
in Figure 4b, this nonlinearity is a result of complexity; in the absence of complexity the relationship
between relatedness and rigidity is basically linear. The intuition here is that as relatedness increases,
the two businesses become more similar, so the constraint imposed by greater coordination becomes
less costly—what is good for one business is less harmful for the other.
Figure 5 plots the same long run (dis)advantage of diversified firms as Figure 4a, only this time
as a function of complexity (K) for low, moderate, and high levels of relatedness (R = 2, 6, 10,
respectively). It shows that the long run effect of coordination has a nonlinear relationship with com-
plexity as well. We see a clear pattern of a rapid fall in diversification advantage as we introduce
17To be clear, we are not suggesting that diversified firms will, or should, stop coordinating activities once they achieve a
steady state. The procedure described here is simply a mechanical exercise to help us isolate cross-business learning effects
from rigidity effects; one that only works so long as we assume that once the coordinated firm reaches a steady state all
potential learning benefits have already accrued.
18Cross-business learning may still help the diversified firm arrive at the optimal choice for each activity faster, even without
complexity, but we are only focused on the long run consequences of coordination here.
19The extent of cross-business learning may also vary with the level of similarity between the structure of interdependence in
the two businesses. While fully exploring that dimension is beyond our current scope, online Appendix D reports the results of
a robustness check where we allow the structure (and extent) of interdependence to vary across the landscapes, and shows that
our main findings are largely unaffected by this change.
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even modest levels of complexity (K = 2, 4), followed by a relatively flat (and, in some cases,
slightly increasing) slope as complexity increases further. This is consistent with what we had
already seen in Figure 4a, where the line for K = 2 lay far below the line for K = 0 but the line for
K = 10 was quite close to the line for K = 2. This nonlinear effect of complexity is important
because it implies that negative consequences of coordination between businesses for adaptation
do not only matter for extremely complex businesses, where all the different activities within a
business are tightly tied to each other. Even in cases where every activity in the business is only
linked to one or two other activities, such within-business complexity will rapidly amplify the con-
straints of any coordination between businesses, compromising the diversified firm's ability to suc-
cessfully adapt. The basic intuition for this nonlinear effect is that every additional activity
coordinated between businesses constrains several other choices in both businesses. So, for
instance, with a complexity of K = 3 even coordinating two activities between businesses (L = 2)
means that the number of constrained choices may be as high as eight. This multiplier effect means
that even at relatively modest levels of both R and K, most of the firm's choices are already con-
strained, so further increases in complexity have little additional negative effect on adaptation in
diversified firms.
4.2 | The effects of synergy
While our analyses thus far examine the long run consequences of coordination between businesses
as a function of relatedness and complexity, it is clear that this is only part of what distinguishes
diversified firms from their focused counterparts. To fully assess the performance consequences of
coordination, we need to factor in not only these long run consequences, but also the short run syner-
gies (net of bureaucratic costs) that the diversified firm enjoys as a result of coordinating activities
between businesses.
Figure 6a shows the effect of considering synergies between businesses; specifically, it revisits
the results in Figure 3, comparing the average performance of a diversified firm to that of its focused
counterparts over time, only this time allowing for synergies between businesses (specifically, setting
δ= 1N). Figure 6b then plots the performance advantage of the diversified firm (corresponding to
Figure 6a) over time. As the figures show, the inclusion of synergies means that the diversified firm
initially enjoys a performance advantage. This is because it is immediately able to enjoy the benefits
of synergy resulting from the sharing of capabilities between its businesses. As time progresses,
FIGURE 5 Long run
effects of coordination as a
function of complexity
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however, the very coordination between businesses that enabled it to realize those synergies also
makes it harder for each business to adapt, so the diversifier's initial advantage relative to the focused
firms deteriorates, eventually (in this case) turning negative in the long run. Thus, the diversified firm
benefits from synergies between businesses in the short run but these benefits may be (partly or
wholly) undone by the long run negative effects of coordination between businesses. Thus, given
complexity, the promise of synergies may drive firms to coordinate activities between businesses in a
way that leads to lower (and potentially negative) long run performance.
Figure 7a–c explores this point further, showing how long term diversification advantage (as a





these figures make clear, while the addition of synergy increases long run diversification advantage,
especially for high values of relatedness (as we would expect), it does not fundamentally alter the
(a)
(b)
FIGURE 6 (a) Diver-
sified vs. focused firm
performance (with synergy).
(b) Diversification advantage
(with synergy) over time
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nonlinear relationship between relatedness and diversification advantage. We still see a nonlinear
relationship between the long run advantage of the diversified firm and relatedness, with the diversi-
fied firm's advantage falling (and potentially turning negative) as relatedness initially increases, but
then starting to rise as we approach high levels of relatedness. Thus, in the presence of complexity,
moderate levels of relatedness continue to result in the weakest advantage for the diversified firm in
the long run, precisely because the negative long run effects of coordination in this case dominate the
modest synergies realized. Of course, with sufficiently high levels of synergy even a firm diversified
into a moderately related business may realize a long run diversification advantage, but even in that
case we would continue to see a nonlinear effect, with the increase in diversification advantage as we
go from low to moderate relatedness being substantially lower than the corresponding increase when
moving from moderate to high relatedness. Figure 7d shows such a case, with synergies high enough
that even at moderate levels of relatedness the diversified firm is not at a long run disadvantage. Note
that this case requires setting δ= 52N, implying that the firm's capabilities are over 20% more produc-
tive when shared between businesses, even after accounting for bureaucratic costs.
Figure 7a–d also shows that as synergies rise, the long run performance advantage of highly
related diversifiers rises steadily—as we would expect—so that not only do highly related diversi-
fiers outperform their focused counterparts, but, other things being equal, the diversified firm's per-
formance is highest with high relatedness, as it was not in Figure 4a. The intuition here is that as
synergies increase, the benefits of being in highly related businesses come to dominate the negative
effects of coordination on adaptation, even in the long run (especially in cases with high complexity).
Finally, Figure 7a–d also continues to show a nonlinear effect of complexity on diversification
advantage, with the gap between the K = 0 line and the K = 2 line being substantially greater than
the gap between the K = 2 and K = 10 lines throughout.
4.3 | Optimal coordination
The results in Figure 7a–d assume that the diversified firm always chooses to coordinate all activities
that are even slightly related across businesses, consistent with prior work that has generally associ-
ated higher relatedness with greater coordination (Jones & Hill, 1988). That assumption makes sense
so long as we consider only the short run effects of coordination, since in the short run the diversified
firm is always better off coordinating any activities that result in net positive synergies, that is, setting
L = R. Once we recognize that such coordination may have negative long run consequences, how-
ever, it becomes important to consider that the decision to coordinate activities between businesses—
even those that are potentially related—is a choice (Zhou, 2011). So, for instance, a firm could
choose to develop a different brand for each of its businesses, even if both businesses sold to the
same segment of customers (Aggarwal & Wu, 2015), and had a similar value proposition. In this sec-
tion, we therefore consider what would happen if the firm were sufficiently foresighted to recognize
that coordinating its choices across businesses would constrain it from adapting in the long run, and
therefore chose the optimal level of coordination between businesses ex ante.20 Note that we con-
tinue to assume that firms may find it challenging to dynamically change their level of coordination
given adjustment costs (Argyres et al., 2015, 2019), so that L, once chosen, does not change
over time.
20Of course, being able to know the optimal level of coordination between businesses ex ante would require an almost heroic
level of strategic foresight, especially when coupled with the fairly myopic version of local search assumed in our NK model.
Nevertheless, examining the optimal coordination case is interesting because it allows us to consider how well the diversified
firm could have done by endogenously choosing L.





FIGURE 7 (a) Long run diversification
advantage with low synergy (δ= 12NÞ: (b) Long
run diversification advantage with moderate
synergy (δ= 1NÞ. (c) Long run diversification
advantage with high synergy (δ= 32NÞ:
(d) Long run diversification advantage with
extremely high synergy (δ= 52NÞ
1808 CHEN ET AL.
In order to assess the optimal level of coordination, we simulate and derive the long run diversifi-
cation advantage for all values of L for given values of R, K, and δ. Figure 8 shows the result of this
analysis for one set of values: R=8,K=10,δ= 32N. We then define L
* as the value of L where the
firm's long run diversification advantage is highest: in the case shown in Figure 8 that would be
L* = 4. Repeating this exercise for every value of R, K, and δ gives us the optimal coordination level
that the diversified firm should choose, for any given set of parameter values. Clearly, L* = 0 if
δ = 0; absent synergies, the diversified firm should never coordinate any activities between busi-
nesses, as evidenced by the uniformly negative performance of the diversified firm in Figure 4a ear-
lier. Moreover, given that, by assumption, the firm can only realize synergies by coordinating
between similar activities, L*≤R, that is, it never makes sense for the diversified firm to coordinate
entirely dissimilar activities.21
Figure 9a–c shows the values of L* as a function of R and K, for levels of synergy corresponding
to those in Figure 7a–c, respectively. They show that, in general, L* < R, that is, the diversified firm
is better off coordinating only some of the similar activities between its businesses. In the extreme,
they show that with low or even medium synergies L* = 0 with low to moderate relatedness, mean-
ing that in such cases diversification may be a suboptimal choice, with the two businesses being bet-
ter off if left to adapt autonomously (Williamson, 1991) despite the potential for short run synergies
between them.22 Even when diversification is potentially valuable, moreover, the optimal number of
activities to coordinate lies far below the number of potentially related activities between the two
businesses, with this gap being highest for moderate levels of relatedness, and increasing at a
decreasing rate with complexity. Only in the case of very high relatedness and complexity with high
FIGURE 8 Effect of changing coordination levels
21In addition, since by design activities are organized in decreasing order of similarity (and therefore synergy), in choosing L*
the firm is not only choosing the optimal level of coordination, it is also choosing the activities that will yield the highest level
of short run synergies given that level of coordination.
22In principle, such autonomy could be achieved by a single firm diversifying but not coordinating at all across businesses,
though such an arrangement may be challenging, given the impossibility of selective intervention (Williamson, 1985); put
differently, diversification only makes sense if there is at least some coordination between businesses (Hart &
Holmstrom, 2010).
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synergies is the benefit from synergies great enough (and the long run effects sufficiently small) to
make it worthwhile for the diversified firm to coordinate all related activities between businesses.
The results in Figure 9a–c suggest that diversified firms may be susceptible to overcoordination
between businesses. While conventional wisdom might suggest that the firm look for and realize
every possible synergy between two businesses—and doing so might prove beneficial in the short
run—the long run cost of doing so may be an inability to adapt in each business that will impose
severe costs on the diversified firm, especially if complexity within businesses is high and related-
ness between businesses is moderate. Instead, the diversified firm may be better off exploiting only a
handful of the most promising synergies between the two businesses, while leaving several smaller
synergies untapped, so as to retain the flexibility necessary to adapt within businesses.
This overcoordination problem is interesting because it highlights a relatively unexplored dimen-
sion of firm diversification. As previously mentioned, much of the prior research on coordination
costs and their impact on diversification has focused on the breadth of a firm's diversification—
asking how many businesses a firm should enter (Jones & Hill, 1988) and how that answer changes
depending on the relatedness of the businesses in question (Nayyar, 1992; Zhou, 2011). In contrast,
our analysis emphasizes how much a diversified firm should coordinate between any two businesses,
thus focusing attention on the depth of a firm's diversification. The findings in Figure 9a–c thus sug-
gest the existence of a problem of overcoordination that is distinct from, but parallel to, the problem
of overdiversification frequently discussed in the literature (Markides, 1992, 1995) and offers an
alternate but complementary reason why diversified firms may sometimes find themselves at a per-
formance disadvantage relative to focused firms (Miller, 2004).
To further examine the performance of diversified firms, Figure 10a–c plots the long run perfor-
mance advantage of the diversified firm, at the optimal level of coordination (L*) as shown in
Figure 9a–c, respectively. In other words, they plot the maximum long run performance advantage23
the diversified firm could hope to achieve for the given values of relatedness (R), complexity (K),
and synergy (δ), assuming it made the optimal ex ante choice on how much to coordinate between
businesses. These figures show that, once the overcoordination problem is resolved, diversification
advantage unilaterally increases with relatedness, but in a nonlinear way. Specifically, while diversi-
fication into highly related businesses almost always results in a performance advantage, diversifica-
tion into moderately related businesses is not especially advantageous, being generally comparable to
diversification into largely unrelated businesses. The intuition behind this result is that the long run
negative effects of coordination between businesses in moderately related diversifiers mean that they
are generally better off coordinating only a few of the many activities they could potentially coordi-
nate (L* is low), if they coordinate at all, so that they essentially act like unrelated diversifiers, and
achieve similar performance levels.
The results in Figure 10a–c—coupled with those in Figure 9a–c—suggest that not all synergies
are worth tapping, especially for businesses with high complexity. In many cases, firms in complex
businesses may be better off not diversifying into unrelated or moderately related businesses at all;
while doing so may offer some short run synergies, the long run negative impact of coordination on
adaptation means that both businesses are better off staying autonomous. Even where diversification
is valuable, these results, along with those in Figure 7a–c, offer a strong case in favor of conglomer-
ate diversification, that is, diversification where the firm leaves its businesses largely independent,
coordinating only a few activities between them. Not only are all but the most strongly related diver-
sifiers better off in the long run choosing a conglomerate structure where they limit coordination to
23Note that the diversification advantage is always positive at L*; if that were not the case, the firm would always have the
option of not coordinating at all and achieving a performance identical to that of its focused peers.




FIGURE 10 (a) Opti-
mal long run advantage with
low synergy. (b) Optimal
long run advantage with
moderate synergy. (c) Opti-
mal long run advantage with
high synergy
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only a few key activities, but failing to make that coordination choice correctly may have far more
negative long-term consequences for moderately related diversifiers than for largely unrelated diver-
sifiers. Of course, firms are still better off diversifying into highly related businesses, but such busi-
nesses (where the majority of two businesses activities share similarities with each other) may not
always be available.
5 | CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Our study sheds new light on the consequences of coordination between businesses for the long run
performance of diversified firms. Using a simulation based approach, we show that the coordination
of activities between businesses in diversified firms limits adaptation within businesses. While coor-
dination enables diversified firms to realize synergies (net of bureaucratic costs), giving them an
advantage relative to single business firms in the short run, this advantage may decline in the long
run as the individual businesses fail to keep up with their focused counterparts. Moreover, this effect
is jointly moderated by complexity within and relatedness between businesses. In particular, this neg-
ative effect is highest for moderately related diversifiers with moderate to high complexity, so that
firms diversifying into moderately related businesses in pursuit of short run synergies may find them-
selves at a disadvantage compared to their single business counterparts in the long run. Given com-
plexity within its businesses, a firm may therefore be better off limiting the extent of coordination
between businesses, foregoing marginal synergies in order to preserve long run flexibility. Moreover,
these negative long run effects of coordination mean that, even with optimal levels of coordination
between businesses, the long run performance advantage of diversified firms may increase at an
increasing rate with relatedness, with moderately related diversifiers doing just marginally better than
unrelated diversifiers and substantially worse than highly related diversifiers.
The results of our simulation thus extend research on diversification as a source of rigidity
(Natividad & Rawley, 2016; Rawley, 2010)—as well as the costs of coordination in diversified firms
more generally (Jones & Hill, 1988; Zhou, 2011)—by highlighting the role of complexity within
businesses in limiting diversified firms' ability to adapt (Burgelman et al., 2019). On one hand, most
of the findings from our analysis are driven by the presence of complexity; where there is no
interdependence between activities within businesses (K = 0), we do not see any of the nonlinear
effects our study highlights. On the other, we also show that our nonlinear effects arise with fairly
modest levels of complexity (K = 2, 4), such as we would expect to see in many firms, and are not
limited to highly complex businesses. As such, our simulation results emphasize the importance of
keeping within-business complexity in mind when considering the costs of coordination and the
limits to firm scope. In doing so, our study serves as a potential bridge between work in corporate
strategy that has studied the effects of interdependence between businesses (Rawley, 2010; Zhou,
2011) and work on search and adaptation that has highlighted the role of complexity in the context
of a single business (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997).
By examining the adaptive consequences of coordination between businesses, our study also
complements and extends recent work that has highlighted the role of organizational scope choices
as a source of rigidity (Aggarwal & Wu, 2015; Claussen et al., 2015; de Figueiredo et al., 2015;
Gartenberg, 2014; Shaver, 2006; Sorenson, 2003). We contribute to this work by stressing the gap
between a diversified firm's short run and long run performance, showing that, in the presence of
complexity, the same choices that maximize synergies in the short run may also compromise long
run performance by limiting the firm's ability to adapt. As such we offer an additional potential
explanation for why diversified firms may sometimes operate at a discount to focused firms: one that
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does not require either self-interested behavior on the part of managers (Lang & Stulz, 1994) or
adverse selection of underperforming firms into diversification (Miller, 2004; Villalonga, 2004). The
results from our model are thus also consistent with prior empirical work showing that diversification
is associated with less innovation (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992) and that
diversification is more advantageous when diversified firms sustain their innovative efforts (Miller,
2006). Our study also shows that these negative effects of coordination do not monotonically
increase with interdependence between businesses, as prior work might suggest (Natividad & Raw-
ley, 2016; Rawley, 2010; Zhou, 2011). In particular, we show that—consistent with potential for
within-firm replication stressed in evolutionary theory (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Rivkin, 2001;
Zollo & Winter, 2002)—an important source of value in diversified firms is the ability to transfer
knowledge of successful adaptations in one business to the other (Kim & Anand, 2018; Miller et al.,
2007; Williams, 2007), and that these cross-business learning benefits may at least partially offset the
rigidity effects of coordination between businesses.
Our study also contributes to the study of corporate diversification more generally. While the
focus of this work has often been on the breadth of a firm's diversification—examining how many
businesses firms enter and the consequences of doing so (Jones & Hill, 1988; Palich et al., 2000;
Zhou, 2011)—we draw attention to the depth of a firm's diversification, that is, how much it coordi-
nates between any two businesses. While prior work has thus highlighted the problem of excessive
diversification (Markides, 1992, 1995), arguing that diversified firms underperform their focused
counterparts because they compete in too many businesses or choose the wrong businesses, we sug-
gest that diversified firms may also be susceptible to a problem of overcoordination. Our findings
suggest that choosing a level of internal coordination such that the marginal bureaucratic costs just
offset the marginal economies of scope in the short run (Jones & Hill, 1988) may prove suboptimal
in the long run, and that diversified firms may therefore benefit from limiting the extent of coordina-
tion between their businesses, foregoing some short run synergies in order to retain long run flexibil-
ity.24 By emphasizing that the extent of coordination between businesses is a choice (Zhou, 2011),
our study also suggests that firms may trade-off breadth and depth, strategically choosing to realize
fewer synergies between businesses as they widen their portfolio.
As such, our study offers a novel rationale for conglomerate diversification, suggesting that firms
may choose to diversify across relatively unrelated businesses (or, equivalently, treat the moderately
related businesses they enter as though they were largely unrelated, coordinating only one or two key
activities between them) because doing so allows them to be more flexible within businesses. It thus
formalizes and extends early work which showed that the M-form structure is most valuable for
unrelated diversifiers (Hoskisson, 1987; Hoskisson, Harrison, & Dubofsky, 1991) suggesting that the
virtue of such a structure may lie in enabling the kind of limited coordination that is optimal in the
long run. Our study also speaks to the question of whether firms should diversify at all, suggesting
that even where there is some short term potential to benefit from economies of scope between mod-
erately related businesses, despite the costs of information transfer and sharing involved (Jones &
Hill, 1988; Zhou, 2011), firms in complex businesses may be better off in the long run by not diversi-
fying.25 Our findings thus re-emphasize the fundamental tension between coordination and adapta-
tion within organizational hierarchies (Williamson, 1991), and extend recent work on the effect of
24Our study also relates to work on post-merger integration and the advantages of leaving acquired targets independent
(Puranam, Singh, & Chaudhuri, 2009; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007).
25While we consistently treat the complexity of the firm's business as exogenous—consistent with both the NK modeling
literature (Levinthal, 1997) and empirical work examining the effect of interdependence within businesses on performance
(Lee & Alnahedh, 2016; Lenox et al., 2010)—a parallel implication of our findings is that firms seeking to tap into synergies
between moderately related businesses may be better off choosing lower levels of complexity.
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within business complexity on organizational scope and structure choices (Brahm & Tarzijan, 2016;
Weigelt & Miller, 2013).
In emphasizing the idea of optimal coordination, our study also speaks to work on dynamic capa-
bilities (Helfat et al., 2007; Helfat & Winter, 2011; Teece, 2007). As our simulation results show,
choosing the right level of coordination between businesses has substantial performance implica-
tions, and the capability to coordinate optimally between businesses may thus be an important
dynamic capability for diversified firms. While our model does not consider the potential for firms to
dynamically adjust their level of coordination, an implication of the trade-off between short run syn-
ergies and long run flexibility we highlight is that an important capability for diversified firms is the
ability to constantly adjust their internal structure to orchestrate their capability choices across busi-
nesses (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000, 2018) and to realize untapped synergies
while limiting disruptions and remaining flexible (Karim, 2006; Karim & Kaul, 2015). In fact, our
findings for the cross-business learning effect suggest that, in the presence of complexity, businesses
may not only learn best practices on specific activities from each other, they may also learn how best
to organize the various activities within a businesses in order to best manage the interdependencies
between them.
Though not the primary focus of our study, our findings also have implications for the growing
literature on inter-temporal economies of scope (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Levinthal & Wu, 2010)
and the potential for diversified firms to redeploy their resources across businesses over time (Folta,
Helfat, & Karim, 2016; Kaul, 2012; Sakhartov & Folta, 2014, 2015; Vidal & Mitchell, 2015; Wu,
2013). While this work emphasizes the benefits that firms can realize by redeploying resources from
one business to the other (Folta et al., 2016; Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Levinthal, 2017; Lieberman,
Lee, & Folta, 2017), relatively less attention has been paid to the costs of maintaining this option to
redeploy (Levinthal, 2017; Sakhartov & Folta, 2015). To the extent that maintaining the rede-
ployability of a resource (Anand, Kim, & Lu, 2016; Folta et al., 2016) means ensuring that it remains
compatible with its potential use in a future business, it may constrain the firm's ability to adapt that
resource to its current use; consistent with this, empirical work has shown that diversifying firms
have less specialized capabilities ex ante (Miller, 2004). Thus, the need to maintain resource compat-
ibility between current and future businesses may produce negative effects similar to those of coordi-
nating resources choices between current businesses. Future work could extend our simulation model
by considering redeployment into a new market, comparing the performance of redeployers to that of
diversifying or de novo firms (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, & Sarkar, 2004; Ganco & Agarwal,
2009; Kapoor & Furr, 2015; Moeen & Agarwal, 2017; Qian et al., 2012).
Future work could also build on our simulation model in other ways. By extending the familiar
NK model to a diversified firm setting, our study provides the foundation for a range of additional
analyses of how such firms adapt. Thus, future work could build on our model to examine questions
of organizational structure and design (Kim & Anand, 2018; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Sig-
gelkow & Rivkin, 2005, 2006; Weigelt & Miller, 2013), examining, for instance, how decision rights
over the various related and unrelated activities are best assigned, or how different levels of centrali-
zation or decentralization (Alonso et al., 2008, 2015) and incentives for competition or cooperation
(Hill et al., 1992) impact the speed of adaptation in diversified firms. Or it could study how the
effects of coordination on adaptation we document change if we allow the two businesses to vary in
either the level of their complexity (i.e., assume a different K for each landscape) or its structure
(Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2007).
Finally, future work could also study the implications of our findings empirically. While the map-
ping between a simulation model and the real world is necessarily imperfect, our study does offer
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several testable propositions. It suggests, for instance, that the performance advantage of diversified
firms may attenuate with age—with both the profitability and the odds of survival of diversified
firms relative to their focused counterparts declining over time—and that this attenuation may be
more pronounced for moderately related diversifiers than for highly related or unrelated diversifiers.
It also suggests that firms that adopt a more conglomerate like structure may outperform others when
diversifying into unrelated or moderately related businesses, and, more specifically, that such con-
glomerate structures should be especially valuable for innovation in each business. Future researchers
could test these predictions empirically.
To conclude, we use a simulation based approach to study adaptation in diversified firms, arguing
that coordination between businesses to realize synergies may limit adaptation within businesses. We
find that these negative long run effects of coordination increase with both complexity within busi-
nesses and relatedness between businesses, but in a nonlinear way, being highest in the presence of
moderate relatedness and complexity. The presence of these negative long run effects of coordination
not only means that the long run performance advantage of diversified firms has a curvilinear rela-
tionship with relatedness, it also means that firms may be better off limiting the level of coordination
between businesses so as to maintain long run flexibility. Our study thus points to a potential over-
coordination problem in diversified firms, while also offering a novel rationale for conglomerate
diversification.
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